

PowerTech® 

*Developing Secure
IBM i Applications*

- **Introductions**
- Design and Documentation
- Application Ownership and Authority
- A Simple Security Model
- Integrity Considerations
- Resources for Security Officers
- Questions & Answers

Your Speaker



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- Premier provider of security solutions & services
 - 18 years in the security industry as an established thought leader
 - Customers in over 70 countries, representing every industry
 - Security subject matter expert for COMMON
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
- Introductions
- **Design and Documentation**
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- A Simple Security Model
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- Questions & Answers

An application's security design should be an **integral part** of the normal analysis and planning process.

The architecture should be **documented** for later reference.

I'm a programmer!

They *know* I don't do documentation!



Security design documentation is critical for auditors, system administrators, and the “next” programmer. Include information on:

- Overview of the security architecture
- What profiles need to exist (ownership and runtime)
- Which files contain sensitive data (audited or encrypted?)
- What authorization lists are used
- How data is accessed (application programs, Query, FTP, etc.)
- How users gain access (public authority, private authority, adopted authority)
- Any special object runtime attributes (adoption, etc.)

Poor Planning Leads to Failed Execution
(and potentially unsecure applications)

- Introductions
- Design and Documentation
- **Application Ownership and Authority**
- A Simple Security Model
- Integrity Considerations
- Resources for Security Officers
- Questions & Answers

Under IBM i, every object is “owned” by a profile that is initially granted *ALL access to the object.

Object ownership is assigned when the object is first created, and can be changed using the CHGOBJOWN and CHGOWN commands.

Initial ownership is claimed by the user who creates it, or the group that they belong to (depends on their profile settings).



Application Ownership

Display Object Authority

```
Object . . . . . : PAYNEW      Owner . . . . . : PAYOWN
Library . . . . . : PAYROLL    Primary group . . . . . : *NONE
Object type . . . . . : *FILE   ASP device . . . . . : *SYSPAS
Object secured by authorization list . . . . . : *NO
```

User	Group	Object Authority
PUBLIC		EXCLUDE
PAYOWN		*ALL
READONLY		*USE

The owner is automatically granted *ALL access

Bottom

Press Enter to continue.

F3=Exit F11=Display detail object authorities F12=Cancel F17=Top
F18=Bottom

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Consider creating a profile specifically to “own” the related application objects:

- Provides consistency
- Helps simplify save/restore operations



I recommend NOT using IBM-supplied profiles, or allowing programmers to remain the owners.

The “owning” profile does not need any special authority (unless the application performs system tasks using authority adoption).

```
CRTUSRPRF  USRPRF(PAYOWN)  PASSWORD(*NONE)  
SPCAUT(*NONE)  INLPGM(*NONE)  INLMNU(*SIGNOFF)  
LMTCPB(*YES)
```

An application build process or lifecycle manager (aka change control) can ensure correct object ownership and authority settings.

It **is** possible to change the owner's authority so that they cannot access an object that they own!

However, ownership provides certain privileges, such as the ability to set authorities for other users—including themselves!



Application Ownership

Display Object Authority

```
Object . . . . . : PAYNEW      Owner . . . . . : PAYOWN
Library . . . . . : PAYROLL    Primary group . . . . . : *NONE
Object type . . . . . : *FILE    ASP device . . . . . : *SYSBAS

Object secured by authorization list . . . . . : *NONE
```

User	Group	Object Authority
*PUBLIC		*EXCLUDE
PAYOWN		*EXCLUDE
READONLY		*USE

Bottom

Press Enter to continue.

F3=Exit F11=Display detail object authorities F12=Cancel F17=Top

F18=Bottom

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The application design should accommodate objects that are created by the users during runtime.

Typically, the application should:

- Create the new object (CRTxxx)
- Set object ownership (CHGOBJOWN)
- Establish the desired authorities (GRTOBJAUT)

IBM i contains a unique concept called **Public Authority** which is the *default* permission granted to a user who has not been granted any *explicit* authority (including *EXCLUDE).

Public authority is determined by:

- For native objects: public authority is assigned starting from the CRTxxx command
- For IFS objects: public authority is inherited from the parent directory

For native objects, IBM resolves the public authority setting from the command to the library description to the QCRTAUT system value.




Once the *PUBLIC authority is resolved, it's permanent—there is no dynamic link.

There is nothing technically wrong with the *concept* of default public authority.



Problems begin when the QCRTAUT system value remains at its shipped value: *CHANGE
(*That's sufficient to read, change, and delete data!*)

I recommend controlling the public authority default for each individual library.



This permits granular control; especially when the server contains multiple applications with varying authority requirements.

Public Authority

Display Object Authority

```
Object . . . . . : PAYNEW      Owner . . . . . : PAYOWN
  Library . . . . . : PAYROLL   Primary group . . . . . : *NONE
Object type . . . . . : *FILE    ASP device . . . . . : *SYSBAS

Object secured by authorization list . . . . . : *NONE
```

Menu	Group	Object Authority
*PUBLIC		*EXCLUDE
PAYOWN		*ALL
READONLY		*USE

Every object has a default authority (*PUBLIC)

Bottom

Press Enter to continue.

F3=Exit F11=Display detail object authorities F12=Cancel F17=Top
F18=Bottom

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A user must have the required level of authority to access an object based on the requested action.

Authority is determined in the following (basic) sequence:

1. Individual User
2. Group Profile (consolidated if multiple groups)
3. *PUBLIC

IBM i provides 4 authority templates ...

	*OBJOPR	*OBJMGT	*OBJEXIST	*OBJALTER	*OBJREF	*READ	*ADD	*UPD	*DLT	*EXECUTE
*ALL	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
*CHANGE	X					X	X	X	X	X
*USE	X					X				X
*EXCLUDE										

... to quickly assign more complex authorities

	*OBJOPR	*OBJMGT	*OBJEXIST	*OBJALTER	*OBJREF	*READ	*ADD	*UPD	*DLT	*EXECUTE
*ALL	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
*CHANGE	X					X	X	X	X	X
*USE	X					X				X
*EXCLUDE										

These are the OBJECT authorities.

	*OBJOPR	*OBJMGT	*OBJEXIST	*OBJALTER	*OBJREF	*READ	*ADD	*UPD	*DLT	*EXECUTE
*ALL	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
*CHANGE	X					X	X	X	X	X
*USE	X					X				X
*EXCLUDE										

Although endless combinations are possible, it does not have to be as complex as it might seem.

- *EXCLUDE Object cannot be accessed.
- *USE Minimum authority necessary to “use” the object (read it / run it / look at it).
- *CHANGE Adds the ability to modify the object’s contents.
- *ALL Can do everything, including deleting the object itself. Do NOT grant lightly.



Deploy using IBM i templates whenever possible.

Authority Shortcuts

*OBJOPR – Object Operational	Look at the description of an object and use the object as determined by the data authorities the user has.
*OBJMGT – Object Management	Move or rename an object or add members to database files. Superset of *OBJALTER and *OBJREF
*OBJEXIST – Object Existence	Change ownership and delete the object, free storage for the object, perform save and restore operations
*OBJALTER – Object Alter	Add, clear, initialize and reorganize members of database files, after and add attributes of database files, add and remove triggers, change attributes of SQL packages
*OBJREF – Object Reference	Specify database file as the parent in a referential constraint
*AUTLMGT – Authorization List Management	Add and remove users and their authorities from an authorization list.


And these are the DATA authorities.

	*OBJOPR	*OBJMGT	*OBJEXIST	*OBJALTER	*OBJREF	*READ	*ADD	*UPD	*DLT	*EXECUTE
*ALL	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
*CHANGE	X					X	X	X	X	X
*USE	X					X				X
*EXCLUDE										

Authority Shortcuts

*READ	Display the contents of an object, such as viewing the records in a file
*ADD	Add entries to an object, such as adding messages to a message queue, or records to a file
*UPD (Update)	Change entries in an object, such as changing records in a file
*DLT (Delete)	Remove entries from an object, such as removing messages from a message queue or deleting records from a file
*EXECUTE	Run a program or search a library or directory

IBM i performs TWO evaluations before permitting access to an object.




Establishing an application environment that's compliant with object-level security is remarkably quick and easy:

- Place programs in a library and grant *USE access to authorized users
- Place files and data areas in a data library and grant *USE or *CHANGE access to authorized users



If you use adopted or swap authority, you can even set public authority to *EXCLUDE (more on this later).

If you over-secure an object, or fail to elevate authority at runtime, the user will receive an authority failure.



The screenshot shows a terminal window titled "Session B - [24 x 80]". The window contains the following text:

```
Additional Message Information
Message ID . . . . . : CPF2207      Severity . . . . . : 40
Message type . . . . . : Diagnostic
Date sent . . . . . : 02/24/10     Time sent . . . . . : 15:02:48
Message . . . . . : Not authorized to use object PAYROLL in library PAYLIB
type *FILE.
Cause . . . . . : You are not allowed to do the requested function because
you do not have the correct authority.
Recovery . . . . . : Have the security officer or the object owner give you the
```

An “AF” entry will be logged to QAUDJRN audit journal.

(You’ve activated IBM i auditing right?)

Do NOT respond by granting the user *ALLOBJ special authority as this is a system-wide override!!



Determine *why* the failure occurred and correct it.

Private authority is “**named**” access, and granted to an individual user or group profile

(Public authority represents “**anonymous**” access)

Private authority can be more restrictive but is typically *less* restrictive than public authority

Common terms: Deny-by-default &
Least privilege



Private Authority

Display Object Authority

```
Object . . . . . : PAYNEW          Owner . . . . . : PAYOWN
  Library . . . . . : PAYROLL       Primary group . . . . . : *NONE
Object type . . . . . : *FILE       ASP device . . . . . : *SYSBAS

Object secured by authorization list . . . . . : *NONE
```

User	Group	Object Authority
*PUBLIC		*EXCLUDE
PAYOWN		*ALL
READONLY		*USE

Private authorities are for specific users or groups and are optional

Bottom

Press Enter to continue.

F3=Exit F11=Display detail object authorities F12=Cancel F17=Top
F18=Bottom

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Group Profiles



Group profiles are a mechanism for **role-based access control** (RBAC).

Associate users with similar security requirements using a group and grant application authority to the group.

A user can belong to 1 primary group and up to 15 supplemental groups (don't go "group crazy").

Users inherit private and special authorities from ALL of their groups (private authorities are additive).

Group profiles are for organization and authority inheritance and should never be used to sign on (even for development purposes).

Group profiles are created like any other user, except we recommend:

- PASSWORD(*NONE)
- INLPGM(*NONE)
- INLMNU(*SIGNOFF)
- LMTCPB(*YES)

Group Profiles

A group profile is like any other user profile until it's designated as a group profile for another user.

```
Change User Profile (CHGUSRPRF)
Type choices, press Enter.

Keyboard buffering . . . . . *SYSVAL      *SAME, *
Maximum allowed storage . . . . *NOMAX      Kilobyte
Highest schedule priority . . . . 0           0-9, *S
Job description . . . . . QDFTJOB      Name, *S
Group profile . . . . . SECADMINS
Group authority . . . . . *NONE          *SAME, *
Group authority type . . . . . *PRIVATE     *PRIVAT
Supplemental groups . . . . . *NONE          Name, *S
+ for more values
```

Authorization Lists



Authorization lists are an **organizational mechanism** for securing objects with similar security requirements:

- All objects secured by an authorization list obtain private authorities (and, optionally, public authorities) from the list
- You can still grant specific authorities to objects to augment (override) the authorities on the authorization list

CRTAUTL AUTL(myautl) AUT(*EXCLUDE)


ADDAUTLE or EDTAUTL to maintain the list entries



24x7 shop? Changing authorities on an authorization list does NOT require a lock on the object.

Authorization lists are not required; especially for simple authorization schemes. For example, if using adoption or a profile swap, then everything can simply be set to *EXCLUDE.

Authorization lists may help **future-proof** your application security and also permit access from outside the application (e.g. for file downloading).



Authorization Lists

Display Object Authority

```
Object . . . . . : PAYROLL      Owner . . . . . : PAYOWN
Library . . . . . : PAYROLL      Primary group . . . . . : *NONE
Object type . . . . . : *FILE      ASP device . . . . . : *SYSBAS
Object secured by authorization list . . . . . : PAYROLL
```

User	Group	Object Authority
*PUBLIC		*EXCLUDE
PAYOWN		*ALL
READONLY		*USE

This object is secured by the PAYROLL authorization list

Press Enter to continue.

F3=Exit F11=Display detail object authorities F12=Cancel
F14=Display authorization list F17=Top F18=Bottom
(C) COPYRIGHT IBM CORP. 1980, 2005.

Authorization Lists

Display Object Authority

```
Object . . . . . : PAYROLL      Owner . . . . . : PAYOWN
Library . . . . . : PAYROLL      Primary group . . . . . : *NONE
Object type . . . . . : *FILE      ASP device . . . . . : *SYSBAS

Object secured by authorization list . . . . . : PAYROLL
```

User	Group	Object Authority
*PUBLIC		*EXCLUDE
PAYOWN		*ALL
READONLY		*USE

These authorities take precedence over those on the authorization list

Press Enter to continue.

F3=Exit F11=Display detail object authorities F12=Cancel
F14=Display authorization list F17=Top F18=Bottom
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
Authorization Lists

Display Object Authority

```
Object . . . . . : PAYROLL      Owner . . . . . : PAYOWN
Library . . . . . : PAYROLL     Primary group . . . . . : *NONE
Object type . . . . . : *FILE    ASP device . . . . . : *SYSBAS

Object secured by authorization list . . . . . : PAYROLL
```

User	Group	Object Authority
*PUBLIC		*EXCLUDE
PAYOWN		*ALL
READONLY		*USE



You must manually set *PUBLIC to *AUTL to defer to the authorization list

Press Enter to continue.

F3=Exit F11=Display detail object authorities F12=Cancel
F14=Display authorization list F17=Top F18=Bottom
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This is a very popular question. It's typically not a decision of *which* one you should use; consider using them both.


Remember:

- Groups associates users with similar access requirements.
- Authorization List secures objects with similar security requirements.


Group or Authorization List? PowerTech.

your security expert


Before



After



Adoption permits a user to access objects that are normally restricted.



It works by inheriting the authority of the application program's owner profile to supplement the user's own authority.

It's only used if the user's own authority fails the authorization tests.

Normally, a program executes with the authority of the user running it.

Adoption comes into play if the IBM i authority check determines that the user does not have sufficient permission.

Adoption adds the authority of the programs' object owner which can (potentially) increase the effective authority while the program runs.

In addition, authority can be inherited from programs higher in the call stack; however, that is a separate setting.

Some nuances:

- Authority is additive (adoption cannot reduce a user's authority)
- Adoption is not observed in the Integrated File System (use a profile swap instead)
- Authority can be adopted from multiple owning profiles



If a program uses adopted authority, it should never present a command line to the user!

Adopted Authority

Display Program Information

```
Program . . . . . : CFG001C      Library . . . . . : UTLCNFIG
Owner . . . . . : QSECOFR
Program attribute . . . : CLP

Program creation information:
Program creation date/time . . . . . : 01/13/13 06:42
Type of program . . . . .
Source file . . . . . : QCLSP
Library . . . . . : UTLCNFIGS
Source member . . . . . : CFG001C
Source file change date/time . . . . . : 01/13/13 15:56:05
Observable information . . . . . : *ALL

User profile . . . . . : *OWNER
Use adopted authority . . . . . : *YES
Log commands (CL program) . . . . . : *JOB
Allow RTVCLSRC (CL program) . . . . . : *YES
Fix decimal data . . . . . : *NO
```

Activate Adoption by setting this parameter to *OWNER



More . . .

Press Enter to continue.

F3=Exit F12=Cancel

(C) COPYRIGHT IBM CORP. 1980, 2005.

Adopted Authority

Display Program Information

```
Program . . . . . : CFG001C      Library . . . . . : UTLCNFIG
Owner . . . . . : QSECOFR
Program attribute . . . : CLP

Program creation information:
Program creation date/time . . . . . : . . . . . : 06:42
Type of program . . . . .
Source file . . . . . : QCLSRC
Library . . . . . : UTLCNFIGS
Source member . . . . . : CFG001C
Source file change date/time . . . . . : 01/08/13 15:56:05
Observable information . . . . . : *ALL
User profile . . . . . : *OWNER
Use adopted authority . . . . . : *YES
Log commands (CL program) . . . . . : *JOB
Allow RTVCLSRC (CL program) . . . . . : *YES
Fix decimal data . . . . . : *NO
```

And the program will also run with the authority of this profile

More . . .

Press Enter to continue.

F3=Exit F12=Cancel

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Adopted Authority

Display Program Information

```
Program . . . . . : CFG001C . . . . . : UTLCNFIG
Owner . . . . . :
Program attribute . . . :

Program creation information
Program creation date/time . . . . . : 01/08/13 16:06:42
Type of program . . . . . : OPM
Source file . . . . . : QCLSRC
Library . . . . . : UTLCNFIGS
Source member . . . . . : CFG001C
Source file change date/time . . . . . : 01/08/13 15:56:05
Observable information . . . . . : *ALL
User profile . . . . . : *OWNER
Use adopted authority . . . . . : *YES
Log commands (CL program) . . . . . : *JOB
Allow RTVCLSRC (CL program) . . . . . : *YES
Fix decimal data . . . . . : *NO
```

*YES directs IBM i to utilize authorities adopted from the prior programs in the call stack

Use adopted authority : *YES

More . . .

Press Enter to continue.

F3=Exit F12=Cancel

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A built-in function called *MODINVAU* controls whether the adoption is passed to a called program by turning it on and off *inside* the calling program.

This ensures that the correct setting is always active, even if the programmer forgets to set the program attribute correctly.


On: **CallPrc PRC('_MODINVAU') Parm(x'00')**

Off: **CallPrc PRC('_MODINVAU') Parm(x'01')**



Adopted Authority

Program Call Stack



Users Checked

user then APPOWNER

user then APPOWNER
(from PGM_A) then QSECOFR

Only *user* because
USEADPAUT(*NO) and
USRPRF(*USER)

A more modern approach to altering authority is to swap to a more powerful profile.

Swapping relinquishes your current profile attributes and inherits multiple attributes of the target profile, such as:

- Special Authorities
- Private Authorities
- Group membership
- Command Line Permission



Swap Profiles

```
Display Job Status Attributes
System:  ROBINSON
Job:     RTATAMA1      User:  RTATAM      Number:  947752
Status of job . . . . . :  ACTIVE
Current user profile . . . . . :  QSECOFR
Job user identity . . . . . :  QSECOFR
Set by . . . . . :  *DEFINITE
Entered system:
Date . . . . . :  02/11/13
Time . . . . . :  12:54:45
Started:
Date . . . . . :  02/11/13
Time . . . . . :  12:54:45
Subsystem . . . . . :  QINTER
Subsystem pool ID . . . . . :  2
Type of job . . . . . :  INTER
Special environment . . . . . :  *NONE
Program return code . . . . . :  1

Press Enter to continue.

F3=Exit  F5=Refresh  F12=Cancel  F16=Job menu
```

During an active swap, IBM i reacts as if you are signed on as this profile

Swap Profiles

Display Job Status Attributes

System: ROBINSON

Job: RTATAMA1 User: RTATAM Number: 947752

```
Status of job . . . . . : ACTIVE
Current user profile . . . . . : QSECOFR
Job user identity . . . . . : QSECOFR
  Set by . . . . . : *DEFAULT
Entered system:
  Date . . . . . : 02/11/13
  Time . . . . . : 12:54:45
Started:
  Date . . . . . : 02/11/13
  Time . . . . . : 12:54:45
Subsystem . . . . . : QINTER
  Subsystem pool ID . . . . . : 2
Type of job . . . . . : INTER
Special environment . . . . . : *NONE
Program return code . . . . . : 1
```

Auditing is tied to the original job (so concurrent swapping is okay)

More . . .

Press Enter to continue.

F3=Exit F5=Refresh F12=Cancel F16=Job menu

Swapping is performed via security APIs:

- QSYGETPH Get profile handle
- QWTSETP Swap profile using profile handle
- QSYRLSPH Release profile handle

Programs may need to use adoption to satisfy API rules:

- Users must have at least *USE access to the target profile
- If the target profile has an expired password, user must also have *ALLOBJ and *SECADM
- If the target profile is disabled, profile handle may be denied or user must also have *ALLOBJ and *SECADM (depends on API parameters)

Swap Profiles

Retrieve Job Attributes (RTVJOBA)

Type choices, press Enter.

CL var for JOB	(10)	..	_____	Character value
CL var for USER	(10)	..	_____	Character value
CL var for NBR	(8)	..	_____	Character value
CL var for CURUSER	(10)	..	_____	Character value
CL var for TYPE	(1)	..	_____	Character value
CL var for SUBTYPE	(1)	..	_____	Character value
CL var for SYSLIBL	(165)	..	_____	Character value
CL var for CURLIB	(10)	..	_____	Character value
CL var for USRLIBL	(2750)	..	_____	Character value
CL var for ASPGRP	(10)	..	_____	Character value
CL var for LOGLVL	(1)	..	_____	Character value
CL var for LOGSEV	(2 0)	..	_____	Number
CL var for LOGTYPE	(10)	..	_____	Character value
CL var for LOGCLPGM	(10)	..	_____	Character value
CL var for LOGOUTPUT	(10)	..	_____	Character value
CL var for JOBMSGQMX	(2 0)	..	_____	Number

When retrieving the active user, always use *CURUSER*

More...

F3=Exit F4=Prompt F5=Refresh F12=Cancel F13=How to use this display
F24=More keys



Swapping resolves three key challenges with adoption:


- It's honored within the IFS
- Permits up- AND down-grading authority
- Supported by non-5250 interfaces

Swapping is flexible as it can be turned on and off programmatically; however, only one swap can be active at a time.



If a program uses profile swapping, remember to swap back before presenting the user with a command line!

Authority Progression



Understanding how IBM i determines whether access will be granted or denied aids planning and troubleshooting

For a full-sized copy of this chart, email a request to robin.tatam@powertech.com

- Introductions
- Design and Documentation
- Application Ownership and Authority
- **A Simple Security Model**
- Integrity Considerations
- Resources for Security Officers
- Questions & Answers

There are many different ways to build a secure application.



Let's explore how to deploy a native application with authority adoption within a secure library.

Create application owner profile

```
CRTUSRPRF USRPRF(appowner) PASSWORD(*NONE) INLPGM(*NONE)  
INLMNU(*SIGNOFF) USRCLS(*USER) SPCAUT(*NONE) LMTCPB(*YES)
```

Create authorization lists

```
CRTAUTL AUTL(dataautl) AUT(*EXCLUDE)  
CHGOBJOWN OBJ(dataautl) OBJTYPE(*AUTL) NEWOWN(appowner)
```

```
CRTAUTL AUTL(pgmautl) AUT(*EXCLUDE)  
CHGOBJOWN OBJ(pgmautl) OBJTYPE(*AUTL) NEWOWN(appowner)
```

Establish secure libraries for programs and data

```
CRTLIB LIB(pgmlib) AUT(*USE) CRTAUT(*EXCLUDE)  
CHGOBJOWN OBJ(pgmlib) OBJTYPE(*LIB) NEWOWN(appowner)
```

```
CRTLIB LIB(datalib) AUT(*EXCLUDE) CRTAUT(*EXCLUDE)  
CHGOBJOWN OBJ(datalib) OBJTYPE(*LIB) NEWOWN(appowner)
```

Link libraries to authorization lists

```
GRTOBJAUT OBJ(datalib) OBJTYPE(*LIB) AUTL(dataautl)  
GRTOBJAUT OBJ(pgmlib) OBJTYPE(*LIB) AUTL(pgmautl)
```

Create files (and data areas etc.)

```
CRTPF FILE(datalib/myfile) AUT(*LIBCRTAUT)
```

```
CHGOBJOWN OBJ(datalib/myfile) OBJTYPE(*FILE) NEWOWN(appowner)
```

Link files to authorization lists

```
GRTOBJAUT OBJ(datalib/myfile) OBJTYPE(*FILE) AUTL(dataautl)
```

Create programs

CRTPGM PGM(pgmlib/mypgm) AUT(*LIBCRTAUT)

CHGOBJOWN OBJ(pgmlib/mypgm) OBJTYPE(*PGM) NEWOWN(appowner)

Link programs to authorization list

GRTOBJAUT OBJ(pgmlib/mypgm) OBJTYPE(*PGM) AUTL(pgmautl)

Defer public authorities to come from AUTLs

```
GRTOBJAUT OBJ(datalib/myfile) OBJTYPE(*FILE) USER(*PUBLIC)  
AUTL(dataautl)
```


```
GRTOBJAUT OBJ(pgmlib/mypgm) OBJTYPE(*FILE) USER(*PUBLIC)  
AUTL(pgmautl)
```

Set entry point program to use owner authority


```
CHGPGM PGM(pgmlib/myentrypgm) USRPRF(*OWNER)
```

Authorize application users to the entry point

```
GRTOBJAUT OBJ(pgmlib/myentrypgm) OBJTYPE(*PGM) USER(user-or-group)  
AUT(*USE)
```



A Simple Security Model



Some additional considerations

- Objects created during runtime
- Non-5250 access
- Query access
- IFS objects
(Reminder: no adoption in IFS)



- Introductions
- Design and Documentation
- Application Ownership and Authority
- A Simple Security Model
- **Integrity Considerations**
- Resources for Security Officers
- Questions & Answers

Lifecycle applications (aka change control) enable programs to be deployed into a production library—securely and consistently—and establish the correct runtime attributes.



When restoring the application:

- Ensure that the owner profile exists prior to restoring the application objects.
- If private authority is used, restore the user profiles (including authorization lists) and then restore the application objects.
- Finally, restore the user's private authorities using the RSTAUT command.

**An application “builder” (CL program)
greatly simplifies the security configuration process**



At security level 40 or 50, integrity is enforced and user programs must use APIs and approved interfaces to access to system objects.

IBM i performs **Hardware Storage Protection** and **Domain Validation** to prevent system objects being accessed directly via memory pointers.



QSECURITY levels below 40 have well-known security vulnerabilities. Do NOT run below level 40!

Domain Checking

```
Display Object Description - Full
Library 1 of 1
Object . . . . . : SIGNOFF Attribute . . . . . :
Library . . . . . : QSYS
Library ASP device . . . . . : ASP group . . . . . : *SYSBAS
Type . . . . . : group . . . . . : *NONE

User-defined informat
Attribute . . . . .
Text . . . . . : ff

Creation information:
Creation date/time . . . . . : 06/06/05 21:37:17
Created by user . . . . . : *T
System created on . . . . . : 00000000
Object domain . . . . . : *SYSTEM
```

Every object has a domain, *SYSTEM or *USER



Press Enter to continue.

More...

F3=Exit F12=Cancel

(C) COPYRIGHT IBM CORP. 1980, 2005.


Domain Checking

Display Program Information

```
Program . . . . . : CFG00000000000000000000000000000000 : UTLCNFIG
Owner . . . . . : QSEC
Program attribute . . : CLP

Program statistics:
Number of parameters . . . . . :
Program size (bytes) . . . . . : 728
Associated space size (bytes) . . . . . : 2880
Static storage size (bytes) . . . . . :
Automatic storage size (bytes) . . . . . : 024
Number of MI instructions . . . . . : 9
Number of PDI entries . . . . . : 15
Program state . . . . . : *USER
Program domain . . . . . : *USER
Compiler . . . . . : V5R4M0
Earliest release that program can run . . . . . : V5R2M0
Conversion required . . . . . : *NO
```

Every program has a state, *SYSTEM or *USER



More . . .

Press Enter to continue.

F3=Exit F12=Cancel


- Programs running *SYSTEM state can access both *USER and *SYSTEM domain objects.
- Programs running *USER state can only access *USER domain objects.

*USER domain user objects (QUSRxxx) can be created in QTEMP plus anywhere listed in the QALWOBJDMMN system value.



Domain and State compatibility is only enforced at security levels 40 and 50.

Contrary to what many of us were taught, *LIBL increases the risk that an application can be compromised.



*“Tell the
programmers
to stop using
LIBL”

Although hard-coding a library is often not desired, consider using soft-coding library names in a data area or file.

Menus are a beneficial application interface but they are NOT considered adequately secure.

The problem is that:

- Menus are often used as the only form of access control
- Not all access comes via legacy native 5250 (telnet)
- Object security is often deemed unnecessary

Exit programs can provide a **compensating control**; however, best security practices should still be used.

- Introductions
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Comprehensive Security Solutions for Power Systems

Compliance Monitor

Custom auditing and reporting



Authority Broker

Management of privileged users



DataThread

Real-time database monitoring



PowerAdmin

Centralized user profile management



Agent for RSA SecurID

Two-factor authentication for IBM i



Compliance Assessment

Free audit of system-wide security



Network Security

Access control



Command Security

Command monitoring



Interact

Real-time SIEM integration



StandGuard Anti-Virus

Advanced native virus detection



Password Self Help

Self-service password reset


I can perform a Risk Assessment of your IBM i



YOUR PC




YOUR IBM i SERVER



YOUR VULNERABILITIES

Online Compliance Guide



Compliance Assessment

Reviewing Security Vulnerabilities

1) Network Security
Is your system i data safe within its network?

The System i is shipped with a wide variety of network services pre-configured and ready to communicate with other nearby computers. All System i systems should have network services secured by installing programs on IBM network servers to monitor and control network access.

There are three ways to access data on an AS/400 system; through a menu and an application, from a system command line, or across a network. Most applications do a sufficient job of securing access through the menu and through command lines. **However, the greatest risk of abuse remains both internal and external network access using data transfer capable tools.**

Several COBIT objectives apply to this section:

COBIT DSS.3 - Identity Management
All users (internal, external and temporary) and their activity on IT systems (business application, system operation, development and maintenance) should be uniquely identifiable. User access rights to systems and data should be in line with defined and documented business needs and job requirements.


COBIT DSS.5 - Security Testing, Surveillance and Monitoring
Ensure that IT security implementation is tested and monitored proactively. IT security should be reaccredited periodically to ensure the approved security level is maintained. A logging and monitoring function enables the early detection of unusual or abnormal activities that may need to be addressed.


2) User Default Rights (Public Authority)
Are your assets protected by data security?

To mitigate the risk of unauthorized access, auditors recommend that "PUBLIC" is "EXCLUDE" on every significant production database and source code and that individuals or groups of individuals are specifically given the necessary authority as required.

Check Public Authority to **all** significant production source code and databases. It should be set to exclude with access allowed only through appropriate individual settings. [Checking authority to libraries](#) is a good place to start.

Security Policy



PowerTech 
your security expert

IBM i SECURITY POLICY

Purpose: The purpose of this IBM i Security Policy is to establish baseline security standards for the configuration of Power Systems running IBM i (System i, iSeries, AS/400). Implementing this security policy can help you minimize unauthorized access to proprietary information and technology. This policy is copyrighted material of PowerTech. There is no charge for its use. Copying, distribution, and modification issues are covered in the terms of the license agreement at the back of this document.

1.0 Physical Security

- Keep the computer system in a secure room, or in an area with limited personnel access.
- The computer room doors must have locks that can record who accessed the computer room on any given date and time.
- The computer rooms should have a limited number of windows, or no windows. If there are windows, you should have adequate barriers or alarms to prevent human access.
- Maintain a list of the people authorized to access the secured computer room and keep it updated.
- Anyone who is not on the list of authorized computer room users must sign in to enter the computer room, be escorted while in the room, and must sign out when they leave.
- The computer room must have adequate power and an uninterruptible power supply (UPS) to ensure continuous operations if regular power is unavailable. The UPS must provide adequate power for at least 10 minutes.
- The computer room must have a fire suppression system to minimize harm to people and damage to equipment in the event of a fire.

2.0 Data Recoverability

- Test the data recovery strategy at least annually.
- Back up the entire system, including the operating system and software utilities, quarterly.
- Back up business applications at least weekly.
- Back up data for business applications daily.
- Journal the data in database files to ensure up-to-the-second recoverability.
- Back up journal receivers daily.
Note: High Availability (HA) software and systems satisfy this requirement.
- Encrypt all sensitive data being written to tape.
- Do not store the encryption keys on the same tape or in the same receptacle as the encrypted data that can be unlocked with those keys.
- Store at least one version of backed-up data off-site.

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- Introductions
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- Integrity Considerations
- Resources for Security Officers
- **Questions & Answers**



**THANK
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